Improving support for signed revisions

[Lasse Kliemann]

* Message by -Arne Babenhauserheide- from Sun 2009-05-10:
> On Wednesday 06 May 2009 22:52:28 Lasse Kliemann wrote:
>
> >> I can picture it as follows:
> >> 
> >>  * On every commit to the changelog, sign the text, then append the
> >> sig as a new extra value to the text, then commit this new text. So
> >> you're not signing the final hash as the other extension does, but the
> >> actual changelog text (which includes the user name and the _manifest_
> >> hash).
> >>  * On verify (and wherever else you want it), check the sig against
> >> the text minus the sig.
> > 
> > That sounds right like it, yes.
> 
> It wouldn't ensure the data, though. 
> 
> I could just grab the signed text and use it to do another commit which will 
> then appear to have been done by the original committer. 

I had assumed that was impossible since the manifest hash was 
also signed (see above). Maybe I'm wrong.

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