User masquerading - audit trail?

[Arne Babenhauserheide]

Am Mittwoch 14 Januar 2009 19:59:37 schrieb Matt Mackall:
> Also note that if we assume developer's repos can be compromised by
> third parties (because, say, they left it open), we must also assume
> that their GPG keys can't be trusted. If I can get you to run arbitrary
> code by putting it in your repo, I can steal your GPG key (and your ssh
> key, and probably your credit card numbers, etc.).

This is true for many workflows, but for exampel for documentation it isn't. 

There I could grant quick push access, but only signed changesets could be 
pushed to the main repo. 

For example I could have a public wiki where I sign off changesets before I 
push. The main repo should only accept changesets I signed, and if I push the 
wrong ones it should stop. 

Best wishes, 
Arne
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